Admin-configured SMTP (server/port/username/password/from address/
STARTTLS, a singleton server_settings row set from /admin -- not env
vars, since it's operator infrastructure a household admin sets up
once through the UI) powers two features, both requiring the relevant
user to have an email set in their own Settings:
- "Forgot password?" on /login emails a one-hour single-use reset link
(password_reset_tokens table). The endpoint always returns the same
generic "check your email" response regardless of whether the address
matched an account, so it can't be used to enumerate registered users.
- A frame's Configuration tab can set a battery-alert threshold
(Frame.battery_alert_threshold_pct, -1 = disabled); POST /frame/battery
emails the owner the first time a report drops to or below it, then
stays quiet for the rest of that discharge cycle (battery_alert_sent,
reset alongside battery_history whenever the existing recharge-jump
detection fires) -- not once per wake.
New app/mail.py wraps stdlib smtplib (no new dependency); send_email()
never raises, so a broken mail server can't 500 a battery report or a
password-reset request. Schema migration v2 adds users.email and the
two frame columns via ALTER TABLE (safe against the live, already-
populated database) plus the two new tables via the existing
create_all-based migration runner.
Verified against a real (already-migrated, real user/frame data)
database: the v1->v2 migration, admin SMTP config + test-email button,
full forgot/reset-password roundtrip (including single-use token
invalidation and the no-enumeration response), and the battery alert
firing exactly once per crossing against a hand-rolled fake SMTP
server -- all via curl end-to-end, plus the standing legacy-device
curl suite to confirm the device protocol is untouched.
The frame-claiming pipeline, end to end. Firmware: every request now
carries ?id=<12-hex STA MAC> via build_url (mirrored in build_ota_url),
and the captive portal's success page became a redirect that hands the
user's browser to <server>/claim?device_id=... after ~7s -- enough time
for the phone to drop the provisioning AP while the device reboots.
The server pushes a per-frame device token through /frame/config during
a one-time handshake; the firmware persists it to NVS (a dedicated
single-key write that deliberately doesn't reset the connected-once
flag or WiFi cache) and prefers it over the provisioned shared token
from the next request on. Config response buffer grows 256->512. Both
board variants compile clean; new firmware also works against an old
server (which ignores ?id=) and old firmware against this server (the
phase A legacy mapping), so either deploy order survives.
Server: /claim lands the captive-portal redirect -- claim-gated signup
(a valid unclaimed/unregistered device id IS the enrollment invitation),
pending claims for the user-beats-the-frame race (auto-attached at
self-registration, 24h expiry), and a waiting page that refreshes until
the frame checks in. Unclaimed/unconfigured frames get a rendered
instruction placeholder with a QR from /frame/image (200, never an
error loop) -- new qrcode dep, placeholder shares the exact
quantize/pack path photos use.
The on-frame manage QR now resolves to a limited no-login page: scans
of / carrying device credentials (new ?id&token or the legacy shared
token) 303 to /m/<manage_token>, which allows exactly view queue,
show-next, advance, back, and scoped thumbnails -- no settings, no
removal, no other frames. Full control means logging in.
One real protocol hole found by simulating full wake cycles: after
self-registration the device could never authenticate again (the wake
cycle fetches the image BEFORE /frame/config delivers its token).
require_device now treats the id itself as the credential until the
first authenticated request flips device_token_ack -- the same trust
level as open registration, closing permanently once the handshake
completes.
Real identity on top of phase A's schema: scrypt-hashed passwords
(stdlib, no new deps -- parameters baked into each stored hash),
server-side sessions (sha256 of the cookie value stored, 30-day rolling
expiry), and per-session CSRF tokens enforced on every mutating
session-authed request -- via X-CSRF-Token for the JSON API (a fetch()
wrapper in base.html injects it, so the existing page scripts didn't
need touching) and a hidden form field for the HTML forms.
/setup runs once while no users exist: creates admin #1, links every
existing frame to them (owner + controller), and inherits the migrated
Immich creds onto their account -- per-user creds are now the primary
source, with env vars still winning as the operator fallback. /login,
/logout, /settings (display name, Immich creds, password change), and
/admin (enroll users, reset passwords, link users to frames, close a
frame's legacy-token window, delete) round out the pages, all in the
existing template/card style.
The legacy shared token stays accepted on browser routes so the
deployed frame's on-panel manage QR keeps working until phase C swaps
it for the limited manage page; token access renders without nav or
CSRF shim and is exempt from CSRF (explicit credential, not an ambient
cookie). Device routes untouched -- the legacy curl suite passes
verbatim.
Identity is provider-pluggable (identity_provider/provider_subject
already modeled) so OIDC can land later without schema surgery.
tfaour