Root-caused the earlier "No matching trusted root certificate found" failure properly this time by reading ESP-IDF's actual bundle-matching code (esp_crt_bundle.c): it looks up a trusted root by the ISSUER name of whatever certificate it can't otherwise validate, not by matching the presented certificate itself. The live server's chain ends in a GTS Root R4 certificate cross-signed by the old GlobalSign Root CA R1 (common Cloudflare/Google Trust Services practice, for compatibility with older/embedded clients) -- and ESP-IDF's current bundle snapshot has dropped that old GlobalSign root entirely, so the lookup came up empty. This was a general gap, not something specific to this one deployment's cert. Fix: keep the standard public CA bundle (esp_crt_bundle_attach) as the trust mechanism -- so any normal reverse-proxy cert (Let's Encrypt, etc.) works out of the box -- and add the one missing root on top via ESP-IDF's CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CUSTOM_CERTIFICATE_BUNDLE mechanism (sdkconfig.defaults), which appends a project-supplied cert file to the bundle at build time. Fetched GlobalSign's official Root CA R1 cert and cryptographically verified (openssl verify) it actually validates the live server's certificate before embedding it -- see firmware/main/certs/additional_root_ca.pem (replaces the old tools_server_ca.pem, which pinned one exact certificate directly and would've broken for anyone else's reverse proxy). Confirmed working against the real deployment on hardware.
ESPresso Frame Firmware
ESP-IDF firmware for the ESP32-C6. On first boot it provisions itself over a WiFi captive portal; after that it wakes on a timer, fetches an already-processed frame from the server, streams it straight to the panel over SPI, and goes back to deep sleep.
See docs/architecture.md for the full boot/fetch
cycle and docs/hardware.md for wiring.
Build and flash
Requires ESP-IDF
(developed against v5.x/v6.x) with the environment sourced (. $IDF_PATH/export.sh
or your distro's equivalent).
idf.py set-target esp32c6
idf.py build
idf.py -p PORT flash monitor
(Ctrl-] exits the monitor.)
The committed sdkconfig.defaults pins an 8MB flash
size and a custom partitions.csv (2MB app partition --
the default "single app" ~1MB partition runs out of room once the HTTP
client, TLS, and vendored fonts/QR library are linked in). If your board
has less flash, you'll need to shrink the app partition and drop features
to fit.
Configuration (idf.py menuconfig)
Under ESPresso Frame Configuration:
| Option | Default | What it does |
|---|---|---|
ESP_AP_SSID |
ESPRESSO |
Provisioning softAP SSID prefix (device appends _XXXXXX from its MAC) |
ESP_MAX_STA_CONN |
4 | Max clients on the provisioning softAP |
ESP_ENABLE_DHCP_CAPTIVEPORTAL |
on | DHCP Option 114 captive portal detection |
FRAME_STA_CONNECT_MAX_RETRIES |
3 | Home WiFi connect attempts before falling back to provisioning |
FRAME_STA_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS |
15000 | Per-attempt WiFi connect timeout |
FRAME_SERVER_CHECK_TIMEOUT_MS |
3000 | Timeout for GET /frame/config (reachability check + refresh interval) |
FRAME_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS |
15000 | Timeout for GET /frame/image |
FRAME_SLEEP_INTERVAL_S |
3600 | Fallback only -- the refresh interval is normally set server-side; see below |
FRAME_RETRY_INTERVAL_S |
300 | Sleep duration after a failed cycle, before retrying |
FRAME_NEXT_BUTTON_GPIO |
2 | Next-photo button GPIO (-1 to disable). Must be 0-7 (ESP32-C6's deep-sleep-wakeup-capable pins) |
FRAME_BACK_BUTTON_GPIO |
0 | Back-photo button GPIO (-1 to disable). Must be 0-7 |
FRAME_COMBO_BUTTON_GPIO |
1 | Menu/reset button GPIO (-1 to disable). Must be 0-7 |
FRAME_COMBO_SOFT_RESET_HOLD_MS |
3000 | How long the combo button must be held (then released) to soft-reset |
FRAME_COMBO_FACTORY_RESET_HOLD_MS |
15000 | How long the combo button must be held to factory-reset |
Under E-Paper Display (epd7in3e) Configuration: SPI/GPIO pin
assignments and SPI clock speed -- see
docs/hardware.md for the wiring these correspond to.
Why FRAME_SLEEP_INTERVAL_S says "fallback"
The actual refresh interval is set from the server's web UI (see
server/README.md) and delivered to the device on
every wake via GET /frame/config, so it can be changed without
reflashing. The Kconfig value only applies before the device has ever
successfully reached a configured server, or if the response doesn't
include a valid interval.
First boot
With no stored WiFi config (a fresh device, or after erasing NVS -- see below), the device brings up the display before anything else and shows a two-step setup screen:
- Connect to WiFi -- a QR code encoding
WIFI:T:WPA;S:...;P:...;;for the device's ownESPRESSO_XXXXXXsoftAP, with the SSID and password also printed underneath for anyone provisioning from a desktop/laptop that can't scan a QR code. - Configure device -- a QR code linking straight to the captive
portal's config page (
http://192.168.4.1/by default), for a one-scan shortcut once you've joined the AP.
The config page asks for your home WiFi SSID/password, the "Tools
Server" address (host:port of the server -- not your
Immich server; see below for the https:// form), and an optional
"Access Token" (see below). Saving reboots the device, which then
connects to your home network and starts its normal fetch/sleep cycle.
HTTP vs HTTPS
The Tools Server field accepts either:
host:port(e.g.192.168.1.50:8420) -- plain HTTP, talks straight to the server, which never speaks TLS itself. This is the default and needs nothing extra.https://host[:port](e.g.https://frame.example.com) -- HTTPS, for a TLS-terminating reverse proxy (nginx, etc.) sitting in front of the server. Every URL the device builds (image fetch, config check, manage-menu overlay data, the QR codes' own links) uses whichever scheme you enter.
The firmware trusts ESP-IDF's standard public CA bundle
(esp_crt_bundle_attach) -- so any reverse proxy with a normal
publicly-trusted certificate just works out of the box: Let's Encrypt,
a Cloudflare-proxied hostname, or any other public CA.
One specific root is added on top of that bundle at build time, from
main/certs/additional_root_ca.pem
(wired in via CONFIG_MBEDTLS_CUSTOM_CERTIFICATE_BUNDLE_PATH in
sdkconfig.defaults): GlobalSign Root CA R1.
This isn't a workaround specific to one deployment -- it's needed
because Cloudflare (via Google Trust Services) commonly cross-signs its
GTS Root R4 chain with this old GlobalSign root for backward
compatibility with older/embedded clients, and ESP-IDF's current bundle
snapshot has removed it (deprecated from modern trust stores). Without
it, ESP-IDF's chain validation -- which looks up a trusted root by the
issuer name of whatever certificate it can't otherwise validate, not
by matching the presented certificate itself -- comes up empty and the
handshake fails with "No matching trusted root certificate found",
confirmed on hardware against a real Cloudflare-fronted deployment.
Since this is a common, not deployment-specific, gap, it's likely worth
keeping even if you're not using Cloudflare.
If your proxy presents a certificate chain the bundle (plus this one addition) still doesn't validate -- an unusual public CA, or a private/ self-signed cert with no public CA in the chain at all -- diagnose with:
openssl s_client -connect <host>:443 -showcerts </dev/null
and add whichever certificate in the chain is missing to
additional_root_ca.pem (or a file of your own, if you'd rather not
touch the committed one) alongside the existing entry, then rebuild.
The device does perform normal hostname verification (it's not
skipped), so the Tools Server field's hostname has to match what the
certificate was actually issued for -- a bare LAN IP address
(https://192.168.1.50) will fail the handshake even against a
perfectly valid cert for a different name.
Access token
If the server has MANAGEMENT_TOKEN set (see
server/README.md), it requires that same value
on every request -- the web UI and every device-facing request the
frame itself makes. Paste it into the captive portal's "Access Token"
field and the device sends it (?token=...) on every request
automatically, and bakes it into the manage-menu/share QR codes so
scanning them just works too. Leave it blank if the server has no
MANAGEMENT_TOKEN configured -- the default, unauthenticated-on-a-
trusted-LAN behavior from before.
Skipping to the next photo
Wire a momentary push button between GPIO2 and GND (internal pull-up,
active-low, same wiring style as the other buttons). A press wakes the
device (if asleep) and tells the server to advance to the next photo
right away, regardless of the configured refresh interval -- no long hold
needed, since advancing is easily reversible by pressing again. See
FRAME_NEXT_BUTTON_GPIO above to change the pin or disable the feature.
Normal wakes and reboots never advance the photo on their own -- the
server decides when to advance based on its own clock (see
server/README.md), so an unplanned reboot just
redisplays whatever was already showing instead of skipping ahead.
Going back to the previous photo
Wire a momentary push button between GPIO0 and GND (same wiring style as
the other buttons). A press wakes the device (if asleep) and tells the
server to return to whichever photo was showing immediately before the
current one, regardless of whether it got there by the normal timer or
the next-photo button. Pressing next afterwards returns to where you
were before pressing back -- it's a real undo, not a separate "recently
shown" list. See FRAME_BACK_BUTTON_GPIO above to change the pin or
disable the feature.
If there's nothing to go back to yet (freshly provisioned, or you've already gone back as far as there is history), it's a no-op -- the current photo stays exactly as it was, no flash on the panel.
Managing the queue, soft-resetting, and factory-resetting
One more button, wired between GPIO1 and GND (same wiring style as the other buttons), covers three actions -- disambiguated purely by how long it's held:
A quick press wakes the device and overlays several corners of whatever photo is currently showing, leaving the middle of the photo visible and unchanged:
- Top-right: a QR code -- "SCAN TO MANAGE" -- linking to the server's config page.
- Top-left: the photo's location, if Immich reverse-geocoded it from GPS EXIF (skipped entirely if not).
- Bottom-right: the date the photo was taken, if known.
- Bottom-left: a QR code linking to a public, view-only Immich share link for that exact photo. The link is only created once someone actually scans it, and expires 30 minutes after that.
After 30 seconds with no further presses it automatically reverts to the plain photo. Pressing the button again while this is up escalates to a second menu level -- everything above, plus the name of anyone Immich has identified labeled right next to their face in the photo (skipped for faces Immich hasn't been told a name for; no face detection happens on the device or the server, this is entirely Immich's own People feature). A third press exits immediately rather than waiting out the 30-second timer. Holding the button during this stage doesn't trigger either reset tier below -- the hold-duration read only ever happens once, right when the device first wakes, before any menu is shown.
The device stays awake for the whole menu interaction (up to three physical refreshes: the base overlay, the escalated one, and reverting), so this costs meaningfully more power than a normal wake -- expected for a deliberate, occasional action, same tradeoff as the other buttons.
Holding it ~3 seconds, then releasing soft-resets the device --
esp_restart(), keeping the stored WiFi/server config. Useful for
recovering a hung device without losing setup.
Holding it ~15 seconds (whether or not you're still holding it -- this fires immediately, it doesn't wait for release) clears the stored WiFi/server config and restarts into provisioning. From either power-on or while the device is deep-asleep, since this GPIO is armed as a wakeup source.
See FRAME_COMBO_BUTTON_GPIO, FRAME_COMBO_SOFT_RESET_HOLD_MS, and
FRAME_COMBO_FACTORY_RESET_HOLD_MS above to change the pin or hold
durations, or disable all three actions.
Without the button wired up (or with FRAME_COMBO_BUTTON_GPIO set to
-1), reconfiguring still works by erasing the NVS partition over USB:
python -m esptool --chip esp32c6 -p PORT erase-region 0x9000 0x6000
(Offset/size match the nvs entry in partitions.csv;
this only wipes the config, not the app itself.)