Files
espresso_frame/server/requirements.txt
T
tfaour 683e3881b1 Redesign phase C: claim flow, limited manage page, device protocol
The frame-claiming pipeline, end to end. Firmware: every request now
carries ?id=<12-hex STA MAC> via build_url (mirrored in build_ota_url),
and the captive portal's success page became a redirect that hands the
user's browser to <server>/claim?device_id=... after ~7s -- enough time
for the phone to drop the provisioning AP while the device reboots.
The server pushes a per-frame device token through /frame/config during
a one-time handshake; the firmware persists it to NVS (a dedicated
single-key write that deliberately doesn't reset the connected-once
flag or WiFi cache) and prefers it over the provisioned shared token
from the next request on. Config response buffer grows 256->512. Both
board variants compile clean; new firmware also works against an old
server (which ignores ?id=) and old firmware against this server (the
phase A legacy mapping), so either deploy order survives.

Server: /claim lands the captive-portal redirect -- claim-gated signup
(a valid unclaimed/unregistered device id IS the enrollment invitation),
pending claims for the user-beats-the-frame race (auto-attached at
self-registration, 24h expiry), and a waiting page that refreshes until
the frame checks in. Unclaimed/unconfigured frames get a rendered
instruction placeholder with a QR from /frame/image (200, never an
error loop) -- new qrcode dep, placeholder shares the exact
quantize/pack path photos use.

The on-frame manage QR now resolves to a limited no-login page: scans
of / carrying device credentials (new ?id&token or the legacy shared
token) 303 to /m/<manage_token>, which allows exactly view queue,
show-next, advance, back, and scoped thumbnails -- no settings, no
removal, no other frames. Full control means logging in.

One real protocol hole found by simulating full wake cycles: after
self-registration the device could never authenticate again (the wake
cycle fetches the image BEFORE /frame/config delivers its token).
require_device now treats the id itself as the credential until the
first authenticated request flips device_token_ack -- the same trust
level as open registration, closing permanently once the handshake
completes.
2026-07-21 23:44:22 -04:00

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fastapi==0.115.6
starlette==0.41.3
uvicorn[standard]==0.34.0
httpx==0.28.1
pillow==12.3.0
python-multipart==0.0.20
jinja2==3.1.5
sqlalchemy==2.0.51
qrcode==8.2